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Abstract
It is known that novices show poor problem-solving performances and that they engage in a 
relatively insufficient inferential reasoning mode. Experts show high performances in routine 
situations in which they only activate knowledge. The main purpose of this work was to test 
the hypothesis that, under some conditions, novices may develop a more efficient diagnostic 
reasoning than experts, i.e. they may discover the cause of a faulty system conducting fewer 
tests  while  avoiding  fixation  errors.  This  hypothesis  mainly  relies  on  the  possibility  that 
experts may be victims of their own knowledge format (French and Sternberg, manuscript). It 
is tested in a faulty electronic circuit troubleshooting task. Data suggest that novices perform 





Expertise is a concept related to the state of a subject's knowledge in a familiar domain. It is 
supported by a context-specific knowledge format (e.g. a schema) that allows the cognitive 
system, provided with the necessary data, to produce reliable outcomes with a reduced load. 
Expertise reduces information processing load and allows the expert to cope with a possible 
increase  (Bisseret,  1970).  After  intensive  practice,  automated  processes  are  sufficient  to 
process a task by associating a response to a situational cue (Rasmussen, 1986, 1993; Fink & 
Lusth, 1987). Practice also reduces the number of steps in problem solving and reduces the 
time  it  takes  to  carry  out  each  step  (Carlson,  Khoo  &  Yaune,  1990).  This  processing 
automatization  allows  the  expert  to  free  the  capacity  of  the  working  memory  (Baddeley, 
1992). 
Expertise produces effects on memorization abilities (Chase & Simon, 1973). Among experts, 
these abilities may be based upon a redistribution of the roles of short-term memory (STM) 
and  long-term memory  (LTM)  that  generates  a  long-term working  memory  (Ericsson  & 
Staszewski,  1989; Ericsson & Kintsch,  1995). These abilities may also rely on frequently 
encountered situations specific memory structures (Boshuizen,  Hobus, Custers & Schmidt, 
1991; Mumma, 1993; Gobet & Simon, 1996a, 1996b; Custers, Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1996). 
When  the  situation  is  recurrent,  experts  can  store  more  information  than  novices.  This 
mnemonic  capacity  difference  relies  on  the  encoding  efficiency  of  relevant  information 
(Wiedenbeck and Fix, 1993) rather than on an ability to process general information (Hunt, 
1992): situational structural changes disrupt expert storage (Barfield, 1986; Norman, Brooks 
& Allen, 1989; Frensch & Sternberg, manuscript). 
Chase & Simon (1973) showed that if information could not be linked with a knowledge 
structure (e.g. in random chess game configurations), then expert recall performance falls to 
the level of novices. Violations in software programming conventions produce the same type 
of  results  among  programmers  (Soloway,  Adelson & Ehrlich,  1988).  Some authors  have 
suggested  that  experts'  processing  may  rely  on  the  problem  structure,  whereas  novices' 
processing may be influenced by its form (Hardiman, Dufresne & Mestre, 1989; Smith, 1992; 
Zajchowski & Martin, 1993). 
Our  position  is  that  experts  and  novices  use  surface  features  for  solving  problems.  The 
difference relies on how they use them, i.e. what type of knowledge these features activate. In 
the case of novices, surface features activate an inferential processing whereas among experts, 
these  surface  features  trigger  task-specific  complex  knowledge  structures:  schemata.  A 
schema is a stored knowledge structure that comprises sequences of steps (Detienne, 1996). It 
is  a  knowledge  block  which  contains  information  and  how  to  use  it.  It  comprises  an 
application domain defined by the activators  it  needs to be triggered.  It  also comprises  a 
procedure  composed  of  an  instantiable  plan  that  depends  on  the  current  situation 
requirements. It both enables relevant information search and the production of information 
when some of the situational data is missing (Van Eslande, 1992; Hunt, 1992). Schemata are 
not equal in weight. They have a specific threshold value from which they can be triggered. 
Some of these that have been recently and frequently used in a given context tend to maintain 
a higher triggering potential than those that have been activated less frequently in previous 
similar  situations.  Schemata  allow fast  processing  of  daily  life  stereotyped  situations  for 
which  one  could  act  in  a  quasi-automated  mode  based  on  an  over-learned  identification 
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(Konradt, 1995). This may lead to biases in unfamiliar situations that share surface features 
with a  familiar  situation.  This  is  the core of  the theoretical  hypothesis.  It  will  be further 
exposed later. 
1.2 Error in diagnosis
The human cognitive system structure implies that errors are liable to occur. The nature of 
these errors differ relatively to the type of implied knowledge and to the subject's competence 
level. There are many factors that determine errors. Human resources boundaries and problem 
complexity are only two of these. 
Every  human  action  is  governed  by  the  complex  interaction  of  two  control  modes.  The 
attentional mode (a), controlled by feedback, is slow, costly, limited, sequential and hard to 
conduct. The automatic mode (b) has no known limits and allows fast information processing, 
parallely1. When confronted with a symptoms pattern in a complex environment, the subject 
has too many concurrent hypotheses to reason sequentially in order to locate a potential cause 
of  the  problem.  Complexity,  especially  if  the  problem  is  unknown,  becomes  a  serious 
potential factor in limitation of resources. Complexity may be a feature of the system (Rouse 
& Rouse, 1979) and cause a decrease in diagnosis  performance as the number of components 
and connections increases (Sanderson, 1990) or may be linked to the diversity of encountered 
situations (Amerge & Mariné, 1992) or to a retro-action delay (Das, Jone & Wong, 1990; 
Hoc,  1996).  With  the  aim  to  avoid  these  problematic  situations,  operators  use  intuitive 
strategies  (Rouse,  1978)  and  implement  automated  procedures  primarily,  when  they  are 
available. 
Faults  can  only  be  detected  from  their  observable  symptoms  (Reed  &  Johnson,  1993). 
Another constraint is the difficulty to process extracted information in order to perform the 
diagnosis (Sanderson & Murtagh, 1990). As the diagnosis process implies the implementation 
of automated procedures, symptoms extraction may be biased by symptoms frequency and by 
their saliency in the environment. Experts are the most liable subjects to this type of error as 
they emphasize frequency in symptoms extraction. 
Experts in diagnosis (e.g. troubleshooters, physicians) recognize specific data patterns and use 
compiled rules and response plans (Gaba, 1991). This problem-solving method is used by 
subjects  who  have  experienced  a  large  number  of  problems  in  a  specific  task  (Reed  & 
Johnson, 1993). In expert diagnosis, fault hypotheses are generated by mapping symptoms to 
knowledge.  Rasmussen  (1993)  calls  symptomatic  strategy  the  process  of  automatically 
activating fault causes from symptoms. Experts rapidly activate information, and only the one 
that is relevant for the current case. Diagnosis is orientated towards a set of elements that may 
contain  the  fault  (Nooteboom & Leemeijer,  1993).  However,  in  some situations  such  as 
detection of an unknown fault cause where usual symptom patterns are absent, experts cannot 
rely on this reasoning mode. The operator thus has to cease implementing usual strategies and 
develop inferences chains in order to reach the goal (Richard, 1990; Konradt, 1995). This is 
called topographic strategy (Rasmussen, 1986, 1993). In diagnosis, ceasing to use a heuristic 
strategy indicates the end of the automated control mode. Shifting to inference in order to 
process diagnosis leads experts to use a high cost reasoning mode they seldom use and that 
they reserve for  unfamiliar  situations  or  situations  that  imply an analytic  reasoning mode 
1 Parallel processing probably relies on time-sharing processes. One may however admit that some motor 




Troubleshooting expert operations are based upon intuitive probabilities. When an operator 
detects  symptoms,  he  or  she  activates  test  procedures  of  some  system  element  liable  to 
explain symptoms. One may think that these procedures are scrolled from the least probable 
to the most probable (Bereiter & Miller, 1989). The rules used during reasoning are selected 
on the basis  of their  implementation  frequency.  Each rule  is  associated to a  strength that 
reflects its past usage (Anderson, 1993). While developing expertise, the rule becomes more 
and more specialized. It becomes active in an ever decreasing number of cases and through 
experience, it becomes activated only in situations where the action it refers to is the correct 
procedure (Ohlsson, 1996). Operators are fallible statisticians (Patrick, 1993) and frequency-
based activation may generate errors. In a routine fault situation, the most frequent cues are 
recognized rapidly and a pattern emerges even if all the symptoms have not been discovered 
(Hoc, 1996). Diagnosis may be processed with incomplete cues. This is the typical expert 
error. It is due to an automated and incomplete symptoms detection. 
Experts efficiency in routine problem solving is a well-known phenomenon. Some researchers 
have shown that experts are sensitive to structure changes (Chase & Simon, 1973; Frensch & 
Sternberg,  manuscript)  when  they  solve  problems.  In  this  research,  we  will  attempt  to 
demonstrate that expert problem solving does not only rely on structural features [contrary to 
the position of Hardiman et al. (1989), Smith (1992) Zajchowski and Martin (1993)] and that 
surface features play a central role. 
Experts  implement  heuristics,  schemata  and  executable  problem-solving  strategies.  They 
conduct their activity on the automated mode. In a routine problem solving, experts launch a 
schema on the basis of situational cues. Schemata accept rough cues and may trigger a series 
of irrelevant  actions  for the current  task (Reason, 1993).  If  the situational  activators  of a 
routine task cause the expert to launch a salient or frequent schema, then this subject may 
ignore  complementary  cues  and may launch an irrelevant  schema.  Although it  cannot  be 
excluded that experts do implement inferences while solving problems, we have focused on 
the  possibility  that  these  subjects  can  persevere  in  the  activated  schema.  In  the  type  of 
situation  studied  here,  the  expert  may  persevere  in  the  activated  schema.  Sanderson  and 
Murtagh (1990) showed this phenomenon in a diagnosis task of a formal network. Subjects 
have difficulties in considering a cause other than the one hypothesized, even if cues in the 
situation suggest that it is not the most acute hypothesis. This error is called fixation error: 
when a schema is activated in the context of a symptomatic strategy, the expert cannot return 
to a topographic strategy and he or she fixes on the knowledge that has already been activated. 
In the studied task2, one makes the assumption that the novice should have fewer difficulties 
than the expert.  The novice reasons  on a  controlled  mode and problems are solved by a 
sequence  of  inferences,  by  a  knowledge-based  reasoning,  not  by  a  [symptom→fault] 
association. The surface features he or she extracts do not launch a schema but are used to 
build a representation of the fault and the produced inferences allow him or her to test more 
diversified hypotheses than experts. 
In other words, when diagnosing a fault in an electronic system, the expert applies a schema 
whereas  the  novice  makes  inferences.  Contrary  to  expert  procedure,  the  novice  does  not 
emphasize  a  particular  component  as  his  or  her  knowledge  does  not  allow  to  sort  the 
frequency of faults. In the case of a fault in an electronic circuit (our task), we expect novices' 
diagnosis process to be indifferently directed towards active components (integrated circuits) 
2 A troubleshooting task in an electronic circuit.
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and passive components (e.g. resistances, condensers, switches).We also expect novices to 
find the cause of the fault in fewer tests than experts. This prediction relies partly on the idea 
that experts may be victims of their format of knowledge (Frensch & Sternberg, manuscript). 
This hypothesis could be considered as a weak one for it is known that prior knowledge may 
be  a  constraint  on  reasoning  activities.  One  could  talk  about  ossified  knowledge  among 
experts that inhibit flexibility. But our hypothesis is rather non-intuitive if one considers that 
novices  can  exhibit  better  performances  than  experts.  As  far  as  we  know,  that  kind  of 
hypothesis is not much documented. 
2 METHOD 
In order to test  the hypothesis  of a better  diagnosis  by novices,  a  troubleshooting task is 
created. The fault is implemented in an amplification circuit. Its originality lies in the fact that 
its frequency is very low but its symptoms are very close to the symptoms of a frequent fault. 
FIGURE 1. Implantation schema.
2.1 Subjects
The subjects are three novices and three experts in electronics. Novices are male bachelor 
students of a technical school. These subjects have been studying electronics for two years. 
Experts are male professional operators in electronics that have between 19 and 20 years of 
experience. 
The low number of subjects  is  explained by the exploratory aim of the study and by the 
difficulty to recruit professional troubleshooters. 
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2.2 Materials
In order to process the troubleshooting task, the subjects use conventional tools (multimeter, 
oscilloscope) and implantation and theoretical schemata. The implantation schema (Figure 1) 
is a representation of the topographic aspect of the circuit that comprises the names of the 
components. The theoretical schema (Figure 2) represents the connections and the names of 
the components. 
2.3 Apparatus
The system3 is a simple low-frequency amplifier. The assembling of the circuit, its schemata 
and components conform to conventions. It has no hidden elements. Schemata correspond to 
the assembly. The board on which the circuit is assembled allows subjects to visualize the 
tracks and the connections between the components. 
2.4 Fault description
The fault is similar to another fault the diagnosis of which is rapid: an integrated circuit (IC) 
failure. The fault is on C7 condenser (cf. implantation schema). This component is in short-
circuit due to a thin invisible weld wire4. 
FIGURE 2. Theoretical schema. 
3 The authors wish to thank Jean Claude GEDIN (CREPCO) for the design of the circuit.
4 This wire simulates the fault of this component (C7) for it was physically impossible to damage it, even by 
connecting it to a 220 V AC. 
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FIGURE 3. Fault description.
The produced symptoms lead to suspect the connected IC as the cause of the fault. In normal 
conditions (i.e. without a faulty C7), IC386 receives the electric signal on the input pin, and 
restitutes it on the output pin, as showed in Figure 3. 
2.5 Procedure
The subject  is  installed  at  a  conventionally  equipped (e.g.  multimeter,  oscilloscope)  post. 
After the instructions are read to the subject, he or she is introduced to the system, and the 
troubleshooting task begins. The tests are noted on a grid (cf. the appendix). The subject may 
replace components. 
The diagnosis stops when the subject finds the faulty component or when he believes that all 
the alternatives have been eliminated. The only questions the experimenter answers refer to 
intervention requests. 
2.5.1 Instructions
The experiment takes place at the work place of the subject,  in a measure laboratory. The 
subject is installed at a post and the experiment is presented. 
I am going to ask you to troubleshoot a low-frequency amplifier. It is faulty at 
the moment. I want you to identify the cause of that fault. In order to proceed, 
you may use any measure tool. You may also use implantation and theoretical 
schemata. These are exact schemata and they correspond to the connections and 
locations  of  the  components  of  the  circuit.  Each  time  you  wish  to  test  a 
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component, you must give me its name as written on the schemata. After each 
test,  you  must  tell  me  whether  you  deduce  anything.  You  must  always  say 
something after a test. Even if you deduce nothing, you must tell me so. 
I have a limited knowledge in electronics. That is why I ask you to speak during 
diagnosis, to "think aloud" as if I could see what you are thinking about so that I 
can  understand  what  you do.  You cannot  touch the  components  except  with 
measure instruments. If you have any intervention to perform on the circuit, you 
must ask me to, and I will do it. 
2.6 Plan of experiment and variables
The plan is S3 < E2 > where E is experience, with two modalities (expert vs. novice). 
Eight  dependent  variables  were  retained.  Only  five  support  the  discussion.  They  were 
calculated  from three  other  secondary  variables.  All  the  variables  concern  three  kinds  of 
indicators: number of tests, tests repetitions and IC tests. These indicators provide information 
about diagnosis length in terms of number of steps, fixation errors and which component is 
concerned by these errors, respectively. 
2.6.1 Secondary dependent variables 
Number of tests of IC386. The value of this variable reflects the importance of this component 
in the diagnosis process. It is the mean number of tests of IC386. This variable comprises 
isolated and chained-tests5. It is used to calculate dependent variable number 1. 
Number of tests before a test of an IC. The value of this variable indicates how soon IC tests 
are performed in the diagnosis process. This variable refers to the number of tests the subject 
performs before a first test of an IC. It is used to calculate dependent variable number 2. 
Number of tests before a test of IC386. The value of this variable indicates how soon IC386 
tests are performed in the diagnosis process. This variable refers to the number of tests the 
subject performs before a first test of IC386. It is used to calculate dependent variable number 
3. 
2.6.2 Main dependent variables (DV) 
DV 1. Percentage of tests of IC386: this variable refers to the proportion of tests of IC386. It 
deals with the centrality of this component in the diagnosis process. 
DV 2. Progression of diagnosis before a test of an IC: this variable refers to the proportion 
before a first test of an IC. It deals with the centrality of this category of components in 
the diagnosis process. 
DV 3. Progression of diagnosis before a test of IC386: this variable refers to the proportion of 
tests  performed  before  a  first  test  of  IC386.  It  deals  with  the  centrality  of  this 
component in the diagnosis process. 
5 A definition of a chained test will be given during the presentation of the variables.
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DV 4. Number of chained tests of IC386. tests are said to be chained when they are performed 
in  a  sequence  without  being  inserted  in  a  split-half6.  This  variable  refers  to  the 
importance of fixation errors. 
DV 5. Number of tests: it is the mean number of tests performed by each group of subjects. 
This variable refers to diagnosis length in terms of steps. 
3 PREDICTIONS
As secondary  dependent  variables  are  used  for  calculation  purposes  only,  the  predictions 
concern main dependent variables. 
If situational cues allow the expert to launch a schema, then the information that does not 
match the schema will probably be neglected. If the activated schema does not allow one to 
find the cause of the fault, it must be revised or abandoned. Calling the schema into question 
is slowed down by the expert's fixation to the implemented strategy. This fixation is assumed 
to be at the origin of the expected difference in performance between experts and novices. 
We expect experts to perform proportionally more tests of IC386 (DV number1) than novices 
for (a) it is a central component in the system and for (b) it often fails. Experts should perform 
less tests than novices before testing an IC (DV number 2) for this type of component often 
fails. IC386 is especially concerned by this prediction (DV number 3). Experts, due to fixation 
errors, should perform more chained tests of IC386 (DV number 4) than novices. Novices 
should  globally  perform less  tests  than  experts  for  their  diagnosis  process  should  not  be 
disrupted by fixation errors. 
TABLE 1. Summary of the results 
Dependent variables Novices Experts
Percentage of tests of IC386 15.38 47.45
Progression of diagnosis before a test of an IC (%) 23.07 3.03
Progression of diagnosis before a test of IC386 (%) 35.38 14.23
Number of chained tests of IC386 0 5.36
Mean number of tests 13 39.33
6 This method consists in splitting the set of the components by an appropriate test (Patrick, James & Friend, 
1996). The optimal strategy consists, after having tested component X and having measured its 
malfunctioning, in modifying the state of a component  that may have effects on X and processing a new test 
of X. 
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FIGURE 4. Percentage of tests of IC386 (DV 1), progression before a test of an IC (DV 2)  
and progression before a test of IC386 (DV 3) as a function of the level of expertise 
(percentages). 
3.1 Results
This research is an exploratory study. The low number of subjects only allows us to test an 
assumption and to measure tendencies. The analysis that is conducted is rather qualitative. No 
analysis of variance was conducted. Only the main dependent variables are presented in Table 
1 and in Figures 4 and 5. 
One novice  did not  find the  cause of  the  fault.  He nonetheless  was included in  the  data 
analysis  for  we  are  more  interested  in  the  implemented  strategies  than  in  the  strict 
identification of the fault. Experts performed three times more tests than novices to find the 
cause of the fault (experts = 39.33; novices = 13). They performed more tests of IC386 than 
novices (experts = 18.66; novices = 2). Experts performed chained tests of IC386 whereas 
novices did not (experts = 5.36; novices = 0). The nature of the symptoms (a condenser fault 
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FIGURE 5. Number of chained tests of IC386 (DV 4) and mean number of tests (DV 5) as a 
function of the level of expertise. 
Tests of IC386 represented an important  part  of diagnosis  for experts  (experts  = 47.45%; 
novices = 15.38%) which reveals a difference in system representation. Experts performed the 
first IC test at an early stage of the diagnosis process (experts progression = 3.03%; novices 
progression = 23.07%). They also performed the first test of IC386 at an early stage of the 
diagnosis process (experts progression = 14.23%; novices progression = 35.38%). The latter 
results  show the importance of the ICs in the diagnosis  process.  This kind of component 
usually explains the symptoms related to the fault. 
4 DISCUSSION 
Results do not contradict the hypotheses. Experts perform more tests than novices and rely 
strongly on ICs. They test these components early and repeatedly in the diagnosis process. 
IC386 is the key component of the diagnosis process. When trying to locate the fault, it is the 
first abnormally behaving component the expert encounters: it receives inputs but produces no 
output. Experts tend to develop a fixation on this component because of its centrality in the 
system and also because of the knowledge they have about its fragility. The frequency of fault 
is used by experts as a tool that guides the diagnosis process. The importance of this heuristic 
is  broadly over-estimated  by experts  which,  when the current  fault  is  not  the one that  is 
expected, makes them produce fixations. 
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A  possible  explanation  of  the  results  is  that  expert  diagnosis  relies  on  a  probabilistic 
reasoning: "The fault finder might select the fault7 which has been most likely to give rise to 
the designated symptoms in the past'' (Patrick, 1993, p. 193). During the diagnosis process, 
the expert extracts symptoms that play the role of activators. Once perceived, they guide the 
diagnosis  process,  making  a  schema  apply.  The  prioritary  schema  among  experts  points 
IC386 as a good alternative for explaining the symptoms. These subjects, when faced with 
IC386 that  has  no  output  signal,  apply  the  most  frequent  troubleshooting  schema:  IC386 
failure. This is what Amalberti and Hoc (1993) call a "rough identification by comparing a 
known schema with observed facts'' (p. 50). 
The main result deals with the percentage of tests of IC386 among experts. It is much higher 
than  among  novices.  In  a  strategic  view,  this  difference  may  be  explained  by  the 
implementation of a frequency heuristic. Our experts have about 20 years of experience. They 
have a  lot  of knowledge about electronics  principles  and also empirical  knowledge about 
failures in the systems. The latter supports an economic strategy that incriminates ICs first. 
Novices have mainly declarative knowledge. This format does not allow them to associate 
symptoms to faults but only inferential processing. This sequential mode has disadvantages in 
complex or high temporal constrained tasks but it offers the advantage of not being liable to 
the frequency bias. The inferences that novices produce in the diagnosis process force them to 
consider  the  absence  of  output  signal  from IC386 as  an  information  that  is  not  relevant 
enough in order to locate the fault. They even seem to consider the absence of signal as a 
consequence of the fault whereas experts consider it as the cause. In the novices' minds, there 
is  no priority  component  when they must  attribute  the cause of  the fault,  or  at  least,  the 
criterion differs from that of the experts. The percentage of tests of IC386 reveals that their 
reasoning  process  is  not  a  probabilistic  one  and  that  their  strategy  does  not  rely  on  the 
frequency of ICs failures. 
At the end of task, subjects were informally asked to say what they thought about the fault. 
Experts said that the fault was difficult to find for C7 (a ceramic condenser) is very reliable 
and is very seldom at fault. They explain the importance of the IC386 in terms of difference 
of fault  probability  between an IC386 and a condenser.  From that  point  of view, experts 
difficulties may be conceived as the sign of normal behaviour. It was hard for them to locate 
the fault because they are experts. In natural situations, one of the experts' strategies consists, 
after having tested the power supply, in testing ICs of the faulty circuit. This procedure agrees 
with the principle of economy: tests first involve active components which are responsible for 
most faults. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Experts identify the state of a component (IC386), measure no output signal and then activate 
the  procedure  that  is  necessary to  replace  this  component.  In  the  fault  detection  process, 
experts  directly  shift  from observation  of  the  oscilloscope  data  towards  the  replacement 
procedure.  This  problem-solving  mode  exhibits  the  absence  of  any  controlled  reasoning 
process.  The  component  replacement  procedure  activation  is  the  result  of  an  automated 
association between a set of symptoms and the cause of a fault. It is a cause-to-effect link that 
experience has developed through empirical observations (Fink & Lusth, 1987). In the case of 
novices, the identification of the abnormal behaviour of IC386 does not imply a replacement 
7 That is, the cause of the fault (Chang, Di Cesare & Goldbogen, 1991).
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decision but instead involves a search for causes of this behaviour and gathering of further 
information. These latter subjects implement a rather topographic strategy. 
Reason  relies  on  Rasmussen's  (1986)  model  to  analyse  human  error.  At  the  level  of 
automatisms,  human  activity  is  controlled  by  stored  configurations  of  pre-programmed 
instructions. Errors at this level are whether the launch of a consistent behaviour at the wrong 
moment  or  place,  or  omissions.  In  this  study,  experts  activate  a  replacement  procedure. 
Performing  many  tests  of  the  IC386  denotes  difficulties  for  the  formulation  of  another 
hypothesis. This type of error is very probable in our task for "the present environmental state 
conforms to past regularities'' (Reason, 1993, p. 104). 
A schema may accept rough specific activators (Reason, 1993). This is one of the features of 
action schemata in relation to cognitive economy and releasing of attentional capacity. One of 
the consequences is the launch of an irrelevant schema. The symptoms that experts extract are 
the ones that would permit an acute diagnosis  in a routine situation (ceramic condensers8 
virtually never fail) but not in the current one. The strength of the association between the 
symptoms and the fault lowers the necessity of an instantiation of the activated knowledge 
(Reason, 1993) and makes it more accessible (Anderson, 1993). 
Lesgold,  Glaser,  Rubinson,  Klopfer,  Feltovitch  and  Wang  (1988)  showed  that  expert 
radiologists  may  produce  less  acute  diagnoses  than  resident  radiologists.  The  authors 
conclude  that  expertise  is  not  a  monotonic  function  of  experience.  It  builds  itself  via 
fluctuations in the performance levels. The number of years of experience per se is not a non-
fallible indicator of the performance level of an operator in his competence domain. 
According to some authors, experts in a problem-solving situation rely on structural features 
whereas novices rely on surface features (Hardiman et al., 1989; Smith, 1992; Zajkowski and 
Martin, 1993). This dichotomy seems excessive. The results of this study show that experts 
rely on surface features. In the case of novices, surface cues support inferences. In the case of 
experts, the same surface cues launch automated processing. Both experts and novices use 
surface features. The difference relies in how they use them. 
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APPENDIX
Tests recording grid
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
HP 
I
P
J
Tsfo 
Radio 
Cordon 
Cl 
C2 
C3 
C4 
CS 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
Cl0 
Rl 
R2 
R3 
R4 
R5 
R6 
741 
386 
Adi 
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